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STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This Reply Brief makes reference to two statutes which are
relevant to the issues discussed herein.

The first is found in the

Utah contractors licensing laws. Although the statute has been reenacted under several titles, chapters and sections, the trial
court referred to this statute as Utah Code Annotated Section 5850-11 (This statutory provision has a long and varied history.
This provision originated as a common-law rule created by the Utah
Supreme Court.

The common-law rule was enacted in 1981 as Utah

Code Annotated Section 58A-1-26, and remained such during the time
relevant to this action.

The Section was re-enacted in 1985 as

Utah Code Annotated Section 58A-la-13.

Section 58A-la-13 was re-

enacted in 1987 as Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11.

Finally,

Section 58-50-11 was re-enacted in 1989 as Utah Code Annotated
Section 58-55-17.

The remainder of this Reply Brief will make

reference to Section 58-50-11 since this is the version the lower
court considered and upon which its decision is based.).

Section

58-50-11 states:
No contractor may act as agent or commence or
maintain any action in any court of the state
for collection of compensation for the performance of any act for which a license is
required by this chapter without alleging and
proving that he was a properly licensed
contractor when the contract sued upon was
entered into and when the alleged cause of
action arose.
In addition to Section 58-50-11, on February 12, 1990, the
Utah

Court

of

Appeals

decided

a

1

case

involving

recovery

of

compensation as an unlicensed engineer.

Utah Code Annotated

Section 58-22-20 (1953 as enacted in 1955) prohibits recovery of
compensation by an unlicensed

engineer similar

to Utah Code

Annotated Section 58-50-11. Section 58-22-20 states, in pertinent
part:
[n]o person shall bring or maintain an action
in the courts of this state for enforcement of
any contract or the recovery of any sums due
in connection with the practice of engineering
or land surveying in this state as defined
herein, without alleging and proving that he
was duly authorized to practice under the
provisions of this act . . . .
The Utah Court of Appeals ruled that the equitable exceptions
to the common law general rule against recovery and which were
created

in the

context

of

contractor

licensing

allowed

the

unlicensed engineer to recover despite the codification of the
general rule in Section 58-22-20.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Contrary to the Defendant's assertions in its Brief, there was
only one basis for the trial court's decision to dismiss the
Plaintiff's Complaint.

The dismissal was only on the basis that

the Plaintiff could not maintain this action pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated Section 58-50-11.

The other grounds and issues raised

by the Defendant as bases for the trial court' s decision did not
actually form the basis of the trial court's decision. Therefore,
they are not properly before this Court an should be disregarded.
The trial court could not have based

its dismissal of

Plaintiff's Complaint upon any alleged failure to comply with

2

contractual
disputed

notice

material

requirements
facts

which

since
would

there

are

prevent

disposition on a motion for summary judgment.

the

significant
case

from

Further, the trial

court could not have based its dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint
upon any alleged failure to allege that it was licensed in the
Complaint since the application of the equitable common law
exceptions would allow an unlicensed contractor to recover in
certain circumstances.

Thus, while the general rule does require

allegation and proof that a plaintiff is licensed, allegation and
proof of licensure may not be required under the equitable common
law exceptions.

Therefore, allegation and proof of licensure, or

exemption therefrom under the equitable common law exceptions, may
be made at some other time in the proceeding than in the complaint.
Further, as discussed in its initial Brief, Plaintiff asserts that
the licensing requirements do not apply to an action to compel
arbitration.
The equitable common law exceptions to the application of the
general rule against recovery do apply to Utah Code Annotated
Section 58-50-11 as required by the rules of statutory construction
and as stated by the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of
Appeals.

The rules of statutory construction dictate that the

equitable common

law exceptions to the general rule against

recovery apply to Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11.

Thus,

absent specific intent to the contrary, a codification of an
existing common law rule will be interpreted and applied in the
same manner as the common law rule. Furthermore, the decisions by
3

the Utah Supreme Court and The Utah Court of Appeals hold that the
equitable common

law exceptions to the general rule against

recovery apply to Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11.
ARGUMENT
Initially, the Defendant's concerns over issues of fact as
stated in its Brief is an indication that this case involves many
disputed issues of material fact which should have precluded
granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and precluded
the dismissal of the Plaintiff's Complaint.

This problem is made

more acute by the fact that the hearing on the motions was
unreported

and this Court does not have the benefit of the

arguments and proffers presented therein. The Defendant has chosen
to attempt to overcome this problem by submitting documents in the
Addendum to its Brief which were not submitted to the trial court
and which do not appear in the record.
Never-the-less, viewing the facts in the best light for the
Plaintiff leads to the unavoidable conclusion that the granting of
summary

judgment

against

the

Plaintiff

Plaintiff's Complaint was improper.

and

dismissing

the

At the very least, it shows

that significant issues of material fact exist which should not and
cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment.
Defendant has cited the case of Franklin v. Nat C. Goldstone
Agency, 204 P.2d 37 (Calif. 1949) for the proposition that the
action filed by the Plaintiff is an action for compensation
although it claims no monetary award but only the enforcement of
the arbitration provision of the subject subcontracts.

4

It should

be noted that the case is from a jurisdiction other than Utah and,
therefore, has no precedential value for this Court.

Further the

case is over forty years old and does not reflect the modern trend
of

favoring

arbitration

as

an

alternative

dispute

resolution

mechanism, as discussed in the Plaintiff's initial Brief. Finally,
the cited case does not reflect the stated strong Utah public
policy favoring arbitration as a method of dispute resolution.
Where the parties to a contract have agreed to an alternative
method of dispute resolution, the Court should not impose a statute
that on its face only prohibits "actions for compensation.,f

Utah

Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 should be construed strictly to
allow an action to compel arbitration.
I.

THERE WAS ONLY ONE BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO
DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT; OTHER ISSUES RAISED BY THE
DEFENDANT DO NOT FORM THE BASIS OF THE TRIAL COURTfS DECISION
AND ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.
In its brief to this Court, Defendant has grossly misstated

the basis of the trial court's decision in ruling against the
Plaintiff.

Defendant's Brief at 1 and 13.

Defendant erroneously

states that the trial court dismissed the Plaintiff's Complaint on
three grounds while, in fact, the trial court based its decision
on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment upon only one ground.
The trial court, in its minute entry dated March 15, 1989, simply
stated that "Defendant's [sic] Motion is granted.

The Court agrees

with defendant's [sic] argument that because the plaintiff did not
have a valid contractor's license it is precluded by statute from
maintaining this action."

Record at 138.

5

Further, the trial

court, in its Order dismissing the Plaintiff's Complaint, stated
only that "Plaintiff is precluded from maintaining its action by
the provisions of the Utah Contractors Licensing Act, Utah Code
Ann., Sections 58-50-1, et seq."

Record at 139 and 140.

It should

be noted that the Defendant is the one that prepared the Order for
the trial court's signature.
There is no other explanation given for the court's decision
to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint and there was no record made
of the hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment.

There were no

findings of fact made by the trial court nor any conclusions of law
made, other than the one which was specifically stated in the
Order.

Furthermore, the Defendant drafted the Order that the court

below signed.
Given

these

circumstances,

it

is

improper

now

for

the

Defendant to claim that the trial court dismissed the Plaintiff's
Complaint on any other grounds than that which is stated in the
Order.

Apparently, the Defendant would have this Court sit as the

trial court to reach issues which were not presented and argued to,
or decided by, the court below.
a.

The Trial Court Could Not Have Based Its Dismissal Of
Plaintiff's Complaint Upon Any Alleged Failure To Comply With
Contractual Notice Requirements.
The trial court did not rule that the Plaintiff failed to

comply with any contractual conditions precedent to making the
claims asserted by the Plaintiff.
the trial court.

It was not even an issue with

Further, this issue is fraught with disputed

factual questions which would preclude resolution of this issue on

6

motion for summai

Im

M.'wiiiip I »•* while it is disputed by

the Plaintiff, the Defendant alleges that the Plajn
qlve notice required under the contract,
its own aflnlivil, ,iJ "j

Yet

the Defendant, in

" 'ial ii mpqotiated with the Plaintiff

regarding the claim of ti-.e PLaintiff for several years pi:lor tu M'H'
f,.\

-, * th:s action,,

affidavi"'

.„

Recoid at; 99,
thcil,

Further, in the Plaintiff's

I h « l>«f^nd.ml. neqotiated

with

Plaintiff and was provided with documentation ot tine claim
during the performance ni

the

since

ti «-* .* t**

Did L

.*•

ntractual requirements?

Did Defendants negotiation with the Plaintiff concerning f he rl.iiii'
for

several

constitute

years

prior

to

the

a A

commencement

of

<*

this

action

contract?

These questions present disputed issues ol i act 'which cannot be
resolved on motion for summary judgment and therefore, coul d not
ha ve served as •

dismiss

the Plaintiff f s Complaint.

Or

in the <*. ternati^ •=

i«? i ssue

-3 as tl" le basis tor th<:» trial court's decisions,, it was

il'ii

improper since there wei e Ji ».»|_ni I cd is-stie:. ul Mint nr la 1 fact relating
thereto.
b.

The Trial court Could Not Have Based Its Dismissal Of
Plaintiff's Complaint Upon Any Alleged Failure To Allege That
It Was Licensed.
! -•

s!"

"".e trial court rule that the Plaintiff's Jomplaint

- lismissed due to a failure 1 o allege that Mackay was

licensed.
decision,

This

too

w<i .

• " M,r

hn*'1

If it had been, an^ dismissal

7

: d±

court's

- : ..i-i.j : : om any such

alleged failure would have been without prejudice rather than with
prejudice as is the case with the court's Order. Additionally, in
the case of Olsen v. Reese, 200 P.2d 733 (Utah 1948), this court
ruled that the trial court must give the claimant an opportunity
to amend his pleadings to correct any alleged failure in pleading
that he was properly licensed prior to a dismissal of the claim on
that basis. Plaintiff was not given this opportunity as required.
Further, since the action brought by the Plaintiff was an
action to enforce the arbitration clauses of the subcontracts, the
provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 do not apply.
Therefore, the Plaintiff should not required to allege and prove
that it was licensed since that Section only bars actions to
recover compensation.
In Olsen, supra, the Court restated the general common law
rule that an unlicensed contractor may be barred from recovery but
remanded the case to allow the claimant to amend his pleadings to
reflect that he was properly licensed. Since 1948, the Utah courts
have adopted notice pleading.

It is questionable whether an

allegation in the complaint to the effect that the plaintiff is
properly licensed is required since by making the claim, the
plaintiff must at some point in time make the allegation and proof,
such as in the case of motions for summary judgment as in the
present case. This makes good sense in light of the fact that even
if a person is not technically proper in his contractor's license,
he may still be allowed recovery by application of the equitable
exceptions to the general rule against recovery.
8

Thus,

«:> il i siiiissa I based u< '•» <•

->"i i

POACI

failure to al lege

that the Plaintiff was licensed w jUxd aiov. ua.e oeen improper si i i< : K 5
determination of that Issue involves numerous issues of material
fact regard.

-

-.

warrant the application

t

-

>..••

^licensed contracto:

-

v

:

•<

in trie Defendant's statement
Defendant's ^ri^f

l ..""! as stated

t u*^ Issues .-. Appeal, Page

' ht- statement

!

r

>* 1
?

I. ol

- g r o u n d s for t h e trial

cour^-' . jisii!.^
the Summary

'""HM-,1

.0 * ;w. \.a . •- common law excep

the qeneral rule against recovery :>y
For

the

s t a n c e s of

hu Argument contained ii • n

II .and ( -?: ) in

Defendant's Brlel at;

Page 13 and subsequently discussed in the Argument commencing at
Page

I,'" ,

a

• 0 1

pi oper 1 'v

before

M » M . Court

and

should

be

disregarded.
II.

THE EQUITABLE COMMON LAW EXCEPTIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF THE
GENERAL RULE AGAINST RECOVERY DO APPLY TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
SECTION 58-50-11 AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION AND AS STATED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS.
The Defendant and the trial court rely on statutory 1 anguage,

c o d i f led

i 11 »; a 1 11 H ne M T I 11 HI IM \ 11 I I u

Previous

to

the

enactment

ot

111 11II1

the statute^

existed in Utah's common law which applied *
occupations wh i«•'»> » ' >»' .v l a L e 1 ei

•

•-* •
oinu,.:,
-ill

pi^i^.ples

rofessions or
.

There is a

long line oh Utah Supreme Court authority ...iterpret. ng the common
law and

the 'various statutes, which cases deal primarily

with

contractor licensing.
The Supreme Court has treated the common law rule and

9

- * 1 s.

the

statutes the same. The many cases indicate that the Supreme Court
has always realized the harshness of declaring unenforceable the
contracts of persons who may not be properly licensed.

"This court

has not applied the general rule of denying relief to unlicensed
persons inflexibly or too broadly."

Fillmore Products, Inc. v.

Western States Paving, 561 P.2d 687, 689 (Utah 1977). In Fillmore,
the Utah court stated:
It is inequitable and unjust to rule as a
matter of law or summary judgment that the
defendant can take the benefit of plaintifffs
labor and refuse to pay for it. . . . The
general rule will no doubt continue to be
maintained as the general rule, while still
permitting the court to consider the merits of
the particular case to avoid unreasonable
penalties and forfeitures.
The purpose of the contractor licensing statute is to protect
the public from inept, unqualified or irresponsible contractors.
Fillmore, supra, at 689. See also, Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800,
805 (Utah 1979), and cases cited therein.

The Supreme Court has

never applied the common law rule or these statutes to deny
recovery to an unlicensed contractor against:

(1) a defendant who

was not intended by the legislature to be protected by the
licensing law, or (2) a defendant who has actual protection from
inept, unqualified or irresponsible contractors apart from the
licensing law. Such a denial of recovery would cause an unreasonable penalty and forfeiture.
The common law rule and the statutes denying recovery should
not be applied when the party from whom plaintiff seeks to recover
is not a member of the class the legislature intended to protect
10

itended

I •i

licensing

law statutes

has been

^utordea

\,

•

s.

L igne11, sugra, at 80H.
This Coiii'i" 11. ia, in
intended

<L xncit • .' : ; censina

for protecting

unwarranted

shield

for

the public
the

should
at

avoidance
'j-. r~nt

Fillmore, supra, a t: 690

l-«w •-

-u:-,-

-

-

(Obligation.

.suuu,

UI-LS ^C-.

*

has developed many exceptions to the general rule against recovery,
Even if the license maintained

aintiff technically had

* •

structure

not been conver ted tc i: ef 1 <
and organization (see Record
reflect substantially

the

it M < l

-MJIH'

though * *.. - icense did
c- * orporat: .:. , ma ny o f

jamp **:.

these equitable coiiini" n Liu cxvc- -.

Plaintiff

to maintain this action to compel • i,<. Defendan
The common 1 aw exception - c a 11.ow r ecovery

t•-; i -.. .:: Licensed

contractor i eijcudLebii ul win,11 I

' -

law rule or the statutes codifying

Kinkella v. Baugh, i>faU I'.J.d

233 (Utah 1983
P ,.'..•! V'bfj I III

;

-j^oitrate.

-

:*e common

Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. v. Chapman, 699
' ac: * L

The case of Wilderness Building Systems makes it clear that
the common law exceptions apply to the statute relied upon by the
Defendant and the trial court. While the Wilderness Court held
that the exceptions did not apply on the particular facts, it
applied the claimed exceptions to the facts of that case and
affirmed that the exceptions established in Lignell, supra
(defendants were protected by their own knowledge and expertise),
and Motivated Management, supra (unlicensed contractor working
under the supervision of a licensed contractor), are still relevant
considerations in light of Utah's codification of the common law
principles.
See also, Pacific Chromalox Division v. Irey, 128
Ut.Adv. Rep. 8 (Ut. App. February 12, 1990) (unlicensed engineer
allowed recovery despite statute substantially similar to Utah Code

In the case of Lignell v. Berg, supra, the

contractor's

unlicensed status did not preclude recovery against the owner•
This Court held that the defendant could not rely on Plaintiff's
unlicensed status.

The defendant was not a member of the class

intended to be protected by the licensing law.
plaintiff's

license

had

inadvertently

In that case, the

lapsed.

Defendant

had

contracted with the plaintiff as a general contractor on previous
occasions and therefore was relying on previous experience with the
plaintiff

and not on any possible

plaintiff's licensed status.

competence

inferred by

the

Further, the plaintiff had recently

proven its technical competence and responsibility by obtaining a
contractors license.

Plaintiff could have renewed its license by

paying a fee and filling out applications for renewal without
additional testing.
The present case presents an even more compelling case for
application of this equitable common law exception.

The Plaintiff

maintained a contractors license at the time the contracts were
entered

with

project.

the Defendant

and

all

during

the

course of

the

Although the name on the license was not identical to the

corporate name, it was substantially similar. And, more importantly, each time the license came up for renewal, the Plaintiff
exhibited

all

of

the

technical

competence

and

financial

Annotated Section 58-55-11 on the basis that the company defending
against the unlicensed engineer's claims was adequately protected
by its own expertise). The Pacific Chromalox case is discussed in
further detail, infra.
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Furthermoi e
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proven its technical competence and responsibility.

The Defendant

herein did

Plaint ,f

on its own experience ' > • .\ ••-

rlaintiti

a.io . r r

iui

»wn expertise.

The defense raised by the Defendant is nothing more than a naked
effori

*

avoid
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dismiss

I uhl
f Motivated Management International v. Finney,
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the complaint

in

•; * • deniec

motion to

«i

pn>

plaintiff had worked under the supervisor

I lie

i a .Lcensed prime

con tractor and the defendant was thereby afforded protection of the
t.f s work

licensing statut
was performed under M:* supervision

.

licensed general contractor.

> i sophisticated general

contractor

knowl edge ab 1 e

Defendant

i I tl le

-efendant, , properly

*

The

Defendant's owi I knowledge and expertise pi jvided iio pi ^te- :*->n,
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not the licensing laws.

See also, Pacific Chromalox Division v.

Irey, 128 Ut.Adv.Rep. 8 (Ct. App. February 12, 1990).

The

Defendant herein is simply not a member of the class intended to
be protected under the licensing laws.
In the case of Kinkella v. Baugh, supra, the unlicensed prime
contractor was allowed to recover the contract price for his
services because the plaintiff's son was a licensed contractor and
supervised the project.

The court stated that the defendant was

afforded protection of licensed contractor status.

Even more

compellingly in the present case, all of Plaintiff's work was
supervised by the Defendant as well as by the engineers employed
by the project owner, UDOT.
to give

UDOT

the

Furthermore, the Defendant, in order

impression

that

the

Plaintiff

was

not a

subcontractor, carried various personnel of the Plaintiff on the
Defendant's payroll.

Record at 112.

In Loader v. Scott Construction Corporation, 681 P.2d 1227
(Utah 1984), a licensed contractor defendant raised the same
statutory defense alleged by the Defendant herein.

This Court

refused to allow the plaintiff's unlicensed status as a bar to
recovery.

The Court held that a defendant who is a licensed

contractor does not belong to the class of persons the general rule
of non-recovery

by an unlicensed

contractor was intended to

protect. The Court stated that a licensed contractor is deemed to
possess the expertise himself.
The licensed contractor consequently cannot
invoke application of the general rule denying
relief to an unlicensed contractor solely
because of the latter's non-licensing when the
14

contract for construction is struck between
them.
As a licensed contractor, Scott [the
defendant] is presumed to possess expertise in
the contracting business. Scott therefore is
not in need of the protection the licensing
statute was i ntended to provide the 1 ay
public.
Loader at 1229.

The Loader case has further similarities to the

The plaintiff f s unlicensed status in Loader was the

case at bar.

resu It of a good I; a 11 h be 1 i <j I I 11.11 IK I IOI I I d
p a r t n e r f s license.
performed

the

-

. > former

Even more compellingly, Tne F l d i n u fi );erein

contract

i^

^**w ^ood

faith

,exiei

iha*

it

was

properly licensed.
Also, In Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western States Paving,
supra, this Coui +
the fal

K

*~

,s 4t

**

inem^Mi contractor

-iiu- * i \« Kt

>

•

the direct supervision cf

-i licensed project engineer and

. <

was checked for compliance with the contract before payment to
piaint iff.
Fillmore,

Her e J I

I 111 • I'" I .HI I I i i I"' * . i

The Plaintiff's work was overseen by

.:^\

Defendant but also the UDOT's own engineers who verified the work
'

and the necessary qu^
a.

The Rules of Statutory Construction Dictate That The Equitable
Common Law Exceptions To The General Rule Against Recovery
Apply To Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11.
The Defendant wouJ d erroneously ?- <^ 4",f

*• ^ «> bt»Ji^ve

that the common law exceptions to the general : . e against recovery
1)Y «HI unlicensed contractor have been abolished
of I he general rule.

The general i. uh»

>- modification
-

' y

l4

Utah legislature and has, through several re-enactments, appeared
15

ie

at one time as Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11.
The Defendant goes to great lengths to cite the Court to cases
which hold that when a legislature substantively amends a statute,
there is a presumption that the legislature intended to change the
existing law.

However, the Defendant ignores the fact that these

cases are easily distinguishable from and do not apply to the
present case. Since the cases cited by the Defendant deal with the
amendment of existing statutes, they are of no benefit in deciding
the present case. Rather, the present case involves the codification of a long-standing common law rule.
Where a legislature merely codifies existing common law, the
rule is that absent an express intention to overrule the existing
common law, new legislation will be presumed to be in line with
prior judicial decisions. Thus, since the Utah legislature merely
codified the existing common law general rule against recovery by
an unlicensed

contractor

and

did

not

express

any

intention

whatsoever to abolish the equitable exceptions, the prior-existing
common law exceptions to the general rule apply to the new
legislation.
The Defendant would have this Court hold that by enacting Utah
Code Annotated Section 58-50-11, the legislature intended that the
common law rule be changed.
statutory interpretation.

However, such is not the law of

The Defendant has cited this Court to

many cases which at first glance may seem to stand for the
proposition which it would have this Court apply to the case at bar
to prevent the application of the common law exceptions to the
16

general rule agaii is f: recovery ,

llowevoi , i ™i >< m i < • J user examination,

none of these cases are on point and do nothing to aid the t'ouit
determining whether the common law exceptions apply under Utah
Code Annotated Sectioi 1 58-50 11.
The question is whether or not there is a presumption that the
]{jiif,j held common 1 aw applies to » statute
different situations where

t:

There are at least two

-

; fi i

the legislature amends an existing statute, and second, where the
legi slati :ii: e enacts an or igina 1 statut The several cases the Det
es which have been amended.

t

,H, ' sl~ i »t«f :••• tM t i /» •••

Thus, in ciJ-uations where the legisla-

tur e substantively amends an existing statute, the correct presumption I is that the legislature

*

•

T " t he

extent that the Defendant intends the cases cited to stanu for this
pi: oposi tion, it ' * at^r * a ! z *
However, such
i.e , where
present

case

th<~ legislateiv
inv- *

••

enacts
-

in original

originally

therefore, the ro _<_

i

statute,

enacted

statute

The
and,

dai I t: ha' P HI » app i ioation ! o

the present case.
The rule ^f statutory interpretation which is applicable to
originally er,». * »-

N-HH" present- r,.»isel(l

is that where the legislature merely codifies an existing common
law ruie*

resumption

intend to change the commo
express

intention

otherwise.

that

••.

legislature

.:
Hie enactment
i

7

ihu,.
of

di'l not
iiisf 111 an

a .statute

winch

simply codifies an existing common law rule does not effect a
change in the law.
This principal of statutory construction has been applied by
the Utah Court of Appeals.

In the case of Pacific Chromalox

Division v. Irey, 128 Ut.Adv. Rep. 8 (Ut.App. February 12, 1990),
the Court of Appeals dealt with the question of whether an
unlicensed engineer could recover for services rendered despite a
statute substantially similar to Utah Code Annotated Section 5850-11. The Court of Appeals, in interpreting the codified general
rule against recovery by an unlicensed engineer, stated "Because
section 58-22-20 only states explicitly what the general rule has
been held to be, we interpret the statute consistently with the
r^se law which has developed under the general rule."

Therefore,

' •* is subject to the same interpretations and application
^ die common law rule had been. Since there was no Utah case law
which

dealt with

recovery

of

compensation

by

an unlicensed

engineer, the Utah Court of Appeals in the Pacific Chromalox case
applied the common law exceptions developed in the contractor
licensing setting to the facts of that case. The cases used by the
Utah Court of Appeals to allow recovery by the unlicensed engineer
are part of the cases relied upon by the Plaintiff.
The Pacific Chromalox case is not the only Utah case to follow
the rule that where a statute is enacted to simply restate the
common law rule, the presumption is that the legislature did not
intend a change in the common law rule. The Utah Court of Appeals
has also taken this position in the case of Home v. Home, 737
18

P. 2d 244 (Ut.App. 1987).

In that case, the Court of Appeals stated

"Statutes are not to be construed as effecting a change in the
common law beyond that which is clearly indicated."

Id. at 248.

There are many other jurisdictions which follow the rule of
statutory construction that where the a statute is enacted as
simply a restatement of the common law rule, the statute is subject
to the same interpretation and application as the common law rule.
A sample of these cases is as follows: Marana Unified

School

District No. 6 v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 144 Ariz. 159, 690
P.2d 711 (Ariz.App. 1984) (unless legislature clearly indicates
intention to do so, its enactments shall not be construed to change
established common law); People v. Cardenas, 31 Cal.3d 897, 184
Cal.Rptr. 165, 647 P.2d 569 (1982) (legislative enactments should
not be construed to overthrow long established principles of law
unless

such

declaration);

intention
Grain

is

Dealers

made

clear

Mutual

to

appear

Insurance

Co.

by

express

v.

Pacific

Insurance Co., Ltd., 768 P.2d 266 (Hawaii 1989) (legislature's
enacting into statute common law concept is clue that courts are
to interpret and apply statute with freedom with which they would
construe and apply common law principle); State v. Jones, 242 Kan.
385, 748 P.2d

839

(1988) (when an act is prohibited

and made

punishable by statute, the statute is to be construed in light of
common law); State v. Bushnell, 38 Wash.App. 809, 690 P.2d 601
(1984) (In the absence of an indication from the legislature to
overrule

the

common

law,

new

legislation

will

be

presumed

consistent with prior judicial decisions); and State v. Stovall,
19

648 P.2d 543 (Wyo. 1982) (A statute designed to change common law
must be strictly construed; it must speak in clear and unequivocal
terms, for presumption is that no change is intended in common law
unless the statute is explicit).
Thus, under the rules of statutory construction, this Court
must apply the equitable common law exceptions to the general rule
against recovery since Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 (and
its predecessor and successor statutes) merely restates what the
common law general rule has been.
b.

The Decisions By The Utah Supreme Court And The Utah Court of
Appeals Hold That The Equitable Common Law Exceptions To The
General Rule Against Recovery Apply To Utah Code Annotated
Section 58-50-11.
The Defendant goes to great lengths to cite this Court to

cases decided in other jurisdictions relating to the application
of the equitable common law exceptions to the rule against recovery
by an unlicensed contractor while completely ignoring or minimizing
the importance of cases decided by this Court and the Utah Court
of Appeals.

These other jurisdictions do not have the same long-

standing common law exceptions to the general rule against recovery
by an unlicensed contractor as does Utah.

These other jurisdic-

tions also do not have the same public policy as Utah which has
been reinforced again and again by this Court (i.e., that the
general rule against recovery should not be applied mechanically
and should not be used to cause unreasonable and unnecessary forfeitures) .

20

Further, as support for its position, Plaintiff has cited to
the Court to the Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. v. Chapman, 699
P.2d 766 (Utah 1985), case in which this Court did apply the common
law exceptions to a case decided under the codified general rule.
While the Defendant attempts to downplay the importance of the
Wilderness case, the Defendant's assertion that since the facts of
the Wilderness case did not warrant the exercise of the common law
exceptions they do not apply in the present case is misplaced.
Defendant's assertions does not change the simple fact that this
Court did apply the equitable exceptions to the facts of that case.
Additionally, since the time the Plaintiff filed its initial
brief, the Utah Court of Appeals has applied the equitable exceptions decided in the context of contractor licensing to a statutory
provision prohibiting an unlicensed engineer from recovering.

In

the case of Pacific Chromalox Division v. Irey, 128 Ut.Adv.Rep. 8
(Ct.App. February 12, 1990), the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed a
decision by the Second District Court for Weber County and held
that the person acting as an unlicensed engineer could recover
compensation despite the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section
58-22-20 (1953 as enacted in 1955).

That Section provides in

pertinent part:
[n]o person shall bring or maintain an action
in the courts of this state for enforcement of
any contract or the recovery of any sums due
in connection with the practice of engineering
or land surveying in this state as defined
herein, without alleging and proving that he
was duly authorized to practice under the
provisions of this act . . . .

21

This Section is substantially the same as the statute involved
in the present case, Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11.

That

Section states:
No contractor may act as agent or commence or
maintain any action in any court of the state
for collection of compensation for the performance of any act for which a license is
required by this chapter without alleging and
proving that he was a properly licensed
contractor when the contract sued upon was
entered into and when the alleged cause of
action arose.
The Utah Court of Appeals, citing George v. Oren Limited &
Associates, 672 P.2d 732 (Utah 1983) as a statement of the common
law general rule, stated:
[i]f the purpose of licensing is to protect
the public, then the general rule in this
State is that the party who does not obtain a
license, but is required to do so, cannot
obtain relief to enforce the terms of his
contract -- including payment thereunder -even though there are other penalties imposed
against him expressly by statute including
criminal sanctions.
Chromalox at 12.
licensed

This common law general rule applies to all

professions

and

occupations,

including

engineers

and

contractors.
The Utah Court of Appeals stated that "Because section 58-2220 only states explicitly what the what the general rule has been
held

to be

[under

the common

law], we

interpret

the

consistently with the case

law which has developed

general

be noted

rule."

It

should

that

the

statute

under

statute

in

the
the

Chromalox case, dealing with engineers, was enacted many years
before the development of many of the common law exceptions to the
22

general rule in the context of the contractor licensing and many
years before the codification of the general rule in the contractor
licensing statutes.
Since the area of recovery of compensation by an unlicensed
engineer is devoid of Utah case law, the Court of Appeals applied
the

common

law

exceptions,

as developed

in

the

context of

contractor licensing, to the general rule as codified at Utah Code
Annotated Section 58-22-20.
Based upon the application of the equitable exceptions, the
Court of Appeals held that the unlicensed engineer could recover
on his contract because Pacific Chromalox was not a member of the
class intended to be protected by the engineering licensing laws
and because whatever protection would have been provided by the
licensing laws was provided by other means, including Pacific
Chromaloxfs own expertise in the area of engineering. This holding
is consistent with the cases upon which the Plaintiff relies
herein.
It should be noted that the Pacific Chromalox case was decided
by the Utah Court of Appeals approximately one month prior to the
filing of the Defendant's Brief.

And while it may be under-

standable how the Defendant missed this important case before
filing its Brief herein, it is unfortunate that the Defendant
failed to address that case in its Brief to the Court.

In any

case, while the Pacific Chromalox case was decided by the Utah
Court of Appeals, it is a persuasive and well reasoned approach to
the application of the equitable exceptions to the general rule
23

against recovery.

The decision in the Pacific Chromalox case

follows the long-standing application of those exceptions by this
Court to payment disputes involving licensed professions.
III. CONCLUSION
There was only one ground upon which the trial court dismissed
the Plaintiff's Complaint.

The trial court stated "Plaintiff is

precluded from maintaining its action by the provisions of the Utah
Contractor Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann., Sections 58-50-1."
Plaintiff need not allege or prove that it was properly licensed
since this is an action to compel arbitration, not an action for
compensation as is specifically stated in the statute. Section 5850-11 should be strictly construed.
Furthermore, under both pre-existing common law and present
Utah law, it was error for the lower court to dismiss the
Plaintiff's Complaint since the equitable common law exceptions to
the general rule against recovery apply to Utah Code Annotated
Section 58-50-11.

This result is dictated by statutory rules of

construction and the decisions by the Utah Supreme Court and the
Utah Court of Appeals.
Even if the Plaintiff's license did not substantially comply
with the contractor licensing law, several of the exceptions to the
codified rule against recovery apply to the present case.

The

Defendant was adequately protected by the supervision by its own
personnel

as well

as by the engineering

personnel

of UDOT.

Further, general contractors like the Defendant are not intended
to have the protection of the contractor licensing law.
24

Their

expertise removes them from the class of protected persons.
allow the Defendant to invoke the rule against recovery

To

as a

defense would work the unjust penalty and forfeiture that the
legislature did not intend and the judicial system cannot allow.
Plaintiff now respectfully requests that this court, based on
the

authorities

and

arguments

cited

herein

and

those

in

the

Plaintiff's initial Brief, reverse the trial court's judgment of
dismissal and remand the case for trial on the merits.
DATED this 11th day of April, 1990.
WALSTAQ^&HBABCOCK, P.C.

By:
Darrel J.
Attorneys

stwick
Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of April, 1990, I caused
to be mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply
Brief of Appellant to Wilford A. Beesley and Stanford P. Fitts of
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH, 300 Deseret Book Building, 40 East South
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,

3-13-mckayply.brf
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County of Salt Lake - State of Utah
R L E N a

TLE:

(^ PARTIES PRESENT)

A.J.

MACKAY COMPANY

COUNSEL:

880908250CN
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:

Robert F.

Babcock

:
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HON. James S. Sawaya

CLERK

March 1 5 ,
DATE.

REPORTER

JUDGE

1989

BAILIFF

The matters of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment to require
arbitration add Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment of dismissal
came on regularly for hearing with appearances as above stated.

The

motions were fully presented, argued and submitted and taken under advisement
by the Court, who now beingffiullyadvised makes its ruling on said motions
as follows;
1* - PLaintiff's Motion is denied*
2.

Defendants

Motion is granted.

Thefiourtagrees with defendant's

argument that because plaintiff did not have a valid contractor's license
it is precluded by statute from maintaining this^action.

L^T/

Copies to cousnel^ft XQ,A . ^ T U ^ l W /QKQ.

0 0 0 1i-*S
3
PAGE. J_OF_±

FILES

nsTBicrc&uir

Third Judicial District

MAR 2 9 1989
^

SALTUKEpGUNTY
y

WILFORD A. BEESLEY
STANFORD P* FITTS
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGE
300 Deseret Book Building
40 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2100
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
A. J. MACKAY COMPANY,

:

Plaintiff,

ORDER

:

vs.

:

OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., :
Defendant.

Civil No. C88-8250
Judge James S. Sawaya

:

Defendant Okland Construction Company,

Inc.'s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
to Compel Arbitration and Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendant's
Counterclaims came on regularly for hearing before the above
entitled Court, the Honorable Jcimes S. Sawaya presiding, on March
13, 1989. Defendant was represented by counsel of record, Wilford
A. Beesley, Esq. and Stanford P. Fitts, Esq.

Plaintiff was

represented by counsel of record Robert F. Babcock, Esq. The Court
having reviewed the memoranda submitted and heard the arguments of
counsel for the parties and being fully advised in the premises,

l

M

<r*C\

HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's

Arbitration

and

Motion

Plaintiff's

for Summary

Judgment

Motion

Dismiss

to

to

Compel

Defendant's

Counterclaims are denied.
2. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted
and Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed.
from

maintaining

its

action

by

Plaintiff is precluded

the provisions

of

the Utah

Contractors Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann., Sections 58-50-1, et
seg.
Dated this ^tf

day of March, 1989.

Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be hand delivered to the following this ^ 3

day of

March, 1989:
Robert F. Babcock, Esq.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
254 West 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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HadfieJd
cooa*co
Adr.Rm.j
**-.m+
because it will have to counter defendant's I
and the other elements attendant on
theory with proof that an alternative theory
obtaining a new trial on the ground
(namely, that the described abuse actually
of newly discovered evidence are
occurred in all of the cases) explains the coipresent. If there be evidence before
ncidence. It also claims that some of the infthe court upon which reasonable
ormation it would be required to use in that
(persons) might differ as to whether
effort is "privileged." We know of no princor not the defendant is guilty,, the
iple of law limiting a defendant's exploration
trial court may deny a motion for a
of facts in his defense because the State
new trial.
refuses or is unable to adduce other facts in
The evidence defendant sought to introduce
rebuttal.
in support of his motion for a new trial was
Defendant has been convicted of seven fel- not in fact newly discovered evidence.* Rather,
onies involving crimes of the most terrible and it was cumulative, irrelevant, or inadmissible.*
reprehensible nature. It is essential that those It was therefore insufficient to support hit
convictions be supported by an unimpeachably motion.4
fair and even-handed process. Defendant's
Zimmerman, Justice, concurs in the
allegations about new evidence relating to the
credibility of Barbara Snow and the children dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Hall.
Stewart, Justice, does not participate
on his motion for a new trial were adequate to
create the need for an evidentiary hearing and herein; Davidson, Court of Appeals Judge,
sat.
the creation of a record upon which this Court
could review the ruling on that motion. We
therefore vacate the trial court's denial of the 1. 30 Utah 2d 77. 80. 513 P.2d 438, 439-10 (Utah
motion for a new trial and remand this case 1973).
for an evidentiary hearing on that motion, 2. State v. WUluuns, 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1983).
including of course the question of whether J. State v. GdUUy, 22 Utah 2d 149. 449 P.2d 993
defendant's proffered evidence may properly (Utah 1969).
be regarded as newly discovered. Defendant, 4. See supra note I.
of course, will be required to comply with the
Utah Rules of Evidence in his offers of evidence. Because of the continuing pendency of
CUe as
that motion in light of this holding, we do not
121 Utah Adv. Rep. t
address further any of defendant's challenges
to the underlying convictions.
* IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WE CONCUR:
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice
Richard C. Davidson, Court of Appeals
Judge

PACIFIC CHROMALOX DIVISION,
Emerson Electric Company,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Richard F. IREY, Industrial Engineering and
Manufactariag Corporation, and John Does I
through V,
Defendants and Respondents.

1. We note, however, thai when asked at trial
whether the bad written a doctoral thesis. Dr. Snow
responded by saying that she had written a
"master's diesis" (on a different topic) and did not
mention the cuay In question. We cannot tell ttom
the record whether there was simply a misunderstanding between defense counsel and Dr. Snow or No. 880203-CA
whether she intended that he not become aware of FILED: February 12, 1990
the subject of her doctoral research.
Second District, Weber County
Honorable John F. Wahlquist
HALL, Chief Justice: (Dissenting)
I dissent because 1 am not persuaded that ATTORNEYS;
the Court abused its discretion in denying Timothy W. Blackburn and Ron R. Kunzler,
defendant's motion for a new trial. As was
Ogden, for Appellant
observed in State v. Hams,1
Ephraim H. Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for
The denial of (a motion for a
Respondents
new trial on the ground of newly
Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Orme.
discovered evidence) will be deemed
an abuse of discretion only in such
OPINION
instances where there is a grave
suspicion that justice may have been
GARFF, Judge:
miscarried because of the lack of
Appellant Pacific Chromalox Division,
enlightenment on a vital point,
Emerson Electric Co. (Chromalox) brought an
which the new evidence will supply;
UTAH

NCE REPORTS

coo*.co
Pacific Cbromalo: Division v. Irey
0
—
Z
frg&um
lililiihj hUtaLi
action against respondents Richard F. Ircy set forth in the purchase order included the
(Irey) and Industrial Engineering and Manuf- I following: The machine was to be capable of
acturtng Corp. (I.E.M.) for breach of contract applying a stud on both ends of a heating coil,
and breach of warranty. Respondents count- which could range in diameter from 06* to
erclaimed for breach of contract and unjust ' .115", at a minimum rate of 600 coils per
enrichment. After a jury trial, the jury ruled hour. It was to accept coils made from twenty
to thirty-two gauge wire, was to be designed
in favor of respondents. We affirm.
Chromalox, a subsidiary of Emerson Elec- and constructed for continuous service, and
tric, is a manufacturer of industrial heating was to allow for convenient servicing and
elements which it sells to companies that repairs. The purchase order specified a deliproduce heating equipment for commercial very date of February I, 1983. I.E.M. was to
Applications. It docs not sell heating elements test the machine at its facility prior to delito residential customers. Irey, as the president very. Chromalox was to pay I.E.M. fifty
and owner of l.E.M., designs and builds one- percent of the contract amount upon satisfaof-a-kind automated machines. I.E.M.'s ctory completion of the machine, with the
staff includes Irey's wife, some machinists and remainder due within thirty days.
I.E.M. did not begin production of the
assembly people, and some consulting enginmachine until after December 7, 1982, when
eers, including Joseph W. Lindsey.
During the summer of 1982, Chromalox's Chromalox sent required documentation regmanager of manufacturing engineering, Ned arding some of the specifications. About this
Blackett, in response to corporate cost- time, Blackett became aware that the previocutting targets, was interested in reducing the usly eliminated washer orienting device might
cost of Chromalox's complicated, labor inte- be necessary to duplicate the manufacturing
nsive process for producing heating coils. He process. He discussed the problem with Irey,
did not know if it was possible to build a who told him that it would not be any
machine to automate this process, but was problem to put a little orienter mechanism on
interested in the possible savings that might the machine. They did not discuss any price
result if such a machine could be built. He increase or extension of the delivery date for
first-offered this 'high risk* project to another the machine.
On March 31, 1983, approximately sixteen
company, which declined it. Blackett then
heard about Irey's work in automation engi- weeks later, Irey delivered the uncompleted
machine to Chromalox's facility at Blackett's
neering and offered the project to him.
- Irey visited the Chromalox facility, located request, because Blackett needed to demonstin Ogden, Utah, and observed the coil prod- rate It to "corporate people" from Emerson
uction process. On about August 10, 1982, he Electric. Irey indicated that it would take two
hand-carried a proposal for the machine to to three weeks to complete the machine, but
Chromalox and met with Blackett. He told that it was to the point that he could complete
Blackett that he could build a machine to it at Chromalox's plant. Because of its uncoduplicate the process exactly. Blackett told mpleted condition, Chromalox did not pay for
Irey that he could not pay more than $75,000 the machine at this time.
However, by April 1983, the machine was
for the machine because of corporate financial
restrictions, but if the machine worked, Chr- still not producing heating coil assemblies, and
omalox might be interested in a second had numerous problems. First, the parties
machine for another plant, and that Chrom- finally determined that addition of the washer
alox had need of other types of automated orienter was necessary. Second, the washer
dispenser on the machine continually jammed.
machinery which Irey might be able to build.
On November 2, 1982, I.E.M., through Although Chromalox suggests that this
Irey, agreed to manufacture the machine for problem was the result of Irey's poor design,
Chromalox for $69,896 plus tax, with delivery Irey indicated that the washers supplied by
to take place in fourteen to sixteen weeks. Irey Chromalox may have caused much of the
arrived at this price by subtracting the requi- problem: He stated that it is understood in the
site amount of sales tax from Chromalox's automation industry that you will get washers
$75,000 ceiling. He deliberately underbid the free from burrs, deformations, and dirt
project, which he figured would cost about because an automated machine cannot handle
1120,000 to complete, because he felt, on the nonidentical parts. Even though Chromalox's
basis of Blackett's representations that a specifications stated that the washers used for
second machine might be needed and that production by the machine would be flat and
Chromalox was interested m additional auto- free from burrs, they were not. Instead, they
mated machinery, that it was an investment in were nonidentical in shape and were mixed
his future business. To meet the price ceiling, with bits of rock left from Chromalox's debIrey and Blackett agreed to eliminate a washer urring operation. Consequently, Irey maintaorienter called for in the original specificat- ined that the problems encountered with the
washer dispenser were a result of the poor
ions.
Blackett filed a purchase requisition for the quality of the washers. Finally, Irey and
machine on November 9, 1982. Specifications i Chromalox engineers determined that it would
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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be necessary to add a previously uncontemplated coil centering device to the machine. In
its initial specification!. Chromalox had represented that the coils used on the machine
would be manufactured to within plus or
minus one coil diameter in length. However,
the coils provided by Chromalox did not
conform to this standard. According to Irey,
the coil centering device was a necessary
modification to compensate for Chromalox's
lack of quality control, but interfered with the
operation of the rest of the machine.
During the ensuing year, Irey continued to
work part time, together with Chromalox
engineers, on the machine at the Chromalox
plant. He spent a considerable amount of time
on two unsuccessful attempts to design and
install the washer orienter while Chromalox
engineers constantly changed the specifications
for the machine.
Although the machine was not operational
during this period, never producing more than
ten or twelve coil assemblies at a time, Chromalox paid Irey the total contract amount for
the machine by October 4, 1983 because Irey
was facing extreme financial pressures. Blacken told Irey that if the machine worked,
Chromalox would be willing to pay I.E.M. an
additional $30,000 for the design and engineering package as an attempt to compensate
him for the additional engineering work.
On March 26, 1984, Blackett authorized the
machine's return to I.E.M.*s facility in Salt
Lake City for the purpose of refining the
washer feeder and finding a way to orient the
washers. During the ensuing ninety days, Irey
again redesigned the washer orienter.
However, the machine developed additional
problems related to the washer feeder and
washer orienter.
Irey returned the machine to Chromalox in
June 1984, representing that it would produce
about 250 pans per hour and that Chromalox
could start training an operator. However, the
machine continually jammed after producing
only a few parts. Nevertheless, Chromalox
trained two operators. One of them, Carolyn
Cromwell, stated that she operated the
machine on and off for about two months,
that the machine only produced twenty-five
coils per hour and seven coils in one sequence,
and that it was always jamming and was under
repair more than it was operational.
In October 1984, the parties decided to
further modify the machine by adding another
operation, cutting off the 'pigtail* hook on
the heating coils, which required the
machine's return to I.E.M.'s facility. Blackett
told Irey that he did not care what Irey did to
the machine but that it had to produce 400
parts per hour to be acceptable, and claimed
that this request was simply for a modification
of Irey's design, not a modification of the
original specification.
The transfer order authorizing the
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machine's return to I.E.M., dated November
1. 1984. indicated that there was to be no
charge for this work. Irey, however, testified
that he had not seen or agreed to this order
prior to the trial. On November 5, 1984,
Chromalox shipped the machine to LE.M.'s
facility by common carrier. Because of Chromalox's admitted negligence, the machine was
damaged during shipping. Robert Slater, a
senior Chromalox engineer, went to I.E.M.*s
facility, verified the damage, and authorized
Irey to repair the damage and bill Chromalox
for the $1,500 repair cost. Chromalox never
paid for this repair, although Blackett alleges
that he deducted it from expenses which
Chromalox had incurred on Irey's behalf.
Because Irey understood, from Blackett's
comments, that he was to *go ahead* with the
machine, he designed, extensively tested, and
debugged a fourth washer orienter and installed it on the machine. Having done this, he
videotaped the machine operating at the rate
of 500 coil assemblies per hour, and with the
assistance of his consulting engineer, ran
timing tests which came out at 7.14 seconds
per cycle, a rate of about 505 parts per hour. . •
In March or April 1985, Irey arranged for
Chromalox representatives to come to the
I.E.M. facility for a demonstration of the
machine. Irey requested that they bring new
coils for the demonstration because the old
coils were bent and damaged from repeated
testing. Chromalox representatives, however,
forgot to bring the new coils, so Irey was
forced to use the old, damaged ones for the
demonstration. Consequently, the machine
malfunctioned during the demonstration.
However, one Chromalox representative.
Slater, indicated that he watched the machine,
which had undergone considerable changes,
operate through its cycle for about ten minutes
with the reclaimed coils, and stated that it
'looked excellent.* He observed that the
machine could be run at 400 pans per hour,
but was unable to run 400 parts because Irey
had insufficient coils to do so. He also testified that the additional parts put on the
machine at Chromalox's request slowed It
down, and that he was expecting to pay approximately $10,000 for the modifications to
the machine. Blackett, however, stated that
the machine would only cycle at a rate of 287
pans per hour and would break down after
several minutes of operation.
Irey asserts that the changes and modifications Chromalox requested after March 31,
1983 required additional engineering and
materials valued at $185,817. He states that
this amount represents nothing but modifications, and be had subtracted out expenses for
which he felt responsible. After the demonstration. Irey was willing to settle with Blackett
for $52,000 for these changes, and demanded
payment. In response, Blackett told Irey that
Chromalox would not pay any more for the
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machine, that Chromalox owned it, and that
Chromalox representatives would come and
pick it up. He testified that Irey never billed
him for the alleged modifications and that the
only modification he requested was the washer
centering device. He further alleged that
Chromalox never accepted the machine as
completed because it never functioned according to the specifications; that Chromalox had
provided Irey with sufficient coils, washers,
and bolts to complete and demonstrate the
machine; and that Chromalox had paid Irey in
full for the machine. Irey asserted a lien
against the machine to secure payment of the
amounts he claimed, and kept the machine.
On April 25, 1985, Chromalox sued respondents, requesting a writ of attachment on the
machine. The court granted Chromalox's writ,
and ordered that the machine should be taken
from I.E.M.'s facility and stored in a storage
unit under the control of the Salt Lake County
sheriff. Respondents moved to quash the writ
and answered Chromalox's complaint. On
November 6, 1985, Chromalox filed an
amended complaint, requesting the return of
the machine, $81,868.87 in damages, reasonable attorney fees and costs, and $20,000 in
punitive damages. Respondents assened a
counterclaim, demanding $186,817 in
damages.
On February 5, 1986, Chromalox moved for
summary judgment, raising the issue that Irey
was prevented from seeking relief through
Utah courts, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§58-22-20 (1963), because he was not
authorized to practice as an engineer. Irey
opposed the motion, indicating that Joseph
Undsey, a licensed professional engineer, had
been on LE.M.'s staff at all relevant times,
and that Robert Onffin, also a licensed professional engineer, had done engineering work
on the machine. The court denied Chromalox's motion.
A jury trial was held on November 17,
1987. The jury found in favor of Irey and
awarded him damages against Chromalox of
$92,500, accrued interest of $24,281, and costs
of $649.75. On January 15, 1988, the trial
court amended the judgment, awarding Irey
$92,500, $23,895.91 in accrued interest,
$285.45 in costs, and awarded possession of
the machine to Chromalox. Chromalox
brought this appeal.
The parties raise the following issues on
appeal: (I) May respondents recover for
breach of contract, given the engineering licensing provisions of Utah Code Ann. §5822-20 (1963); and (2) did the trial court
commit reversible error by refusing to give
Chromalox's requested jury instruction on
breach of warranty?

I.
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ENGINEERING LICENSE
The major issue raised by the parties is
whether, under the relevant provisions of the
Engineers' and Surveyors' Licensing Act,
Utah Code Ann. §58-22-1 to-25 (1963).
respondents may recover for breach of contract.
'
. ,
Chromalox argues that section 58-22-20'
bars I.E.M. from seeking any relief through
the courts because I E.M., through Irey, practiced engineering in the state of Utah without
a license. I.E.M., however, argues that it Is
not precluded from enforcing its contract
because: (1) Chromalox is not a member of
the protected class, the lay public, but rather,
Chromalox is an industrial manufacturer
which sells only to industrial and commercial
users; (2) Irejf believed that he was acting in
compliance with the statute by hiring licensed
engineers to work on the Chromalox project;
and (3) there is evidence upon which the jury
could reasonably conclude that the machine
worked.
' *'
At the outset, we note that the record
clearly indicates Irey practiced engineering in
the state of Utah without a license. Relevant
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §58-22-2
(1963) define the practice of engineering as:
the performance of any professional
service or creative work requiring
engineering education, training and
experience, and the application of
special knowledge of the mathematical, physical, and engineering
sciences to such professional services or creative work as consultation, investigation, evaluation,
planning, design, and supervision of
construction for the purpose of
assuring compliance with specifications and design, in connection
with the utilization of the forces,
energies, and materials of nature in
the development, production, and
functioning of engineering processes, apparatus, machines, equipment, ... employed in or devoted to
public or private enterprise or uses.
Similarly, the term 'practice of engineering*
'comprehends the practice of those branches
of engineering, the pursuit of any of which
affects the safety of life, health or property,
or the public welfare.* Utah Code Ann. §5822-2 (1963). By designing and constructing
the machine, Irey unquestionably engaged in
creative work and professional services requiring application of the physical and engineering sciences. It is undisputed, also, that Irey
was not licensed according to the terms of the
statute. He held no other engineering license
or college degree, and had not engaged in any
formal engineering education.
Section 58-22-2 further states that:
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rule in this State is that the party
(a] person shall be construed to
|
w h o does not obtain a license, but
practice or offer to practice enginI
is required t o d o s o , cannot obtain
eering, within the meaning and
I
relief to enforce the term* of his
intent of this act* ... who holds
I
contract — Including payment
himself out as able to perform, or
I
thereunder - even though there
who does perform any engineering
I
are other penalties imposed against
service or work or any other profI
him expressly by statute including
essional service designated by the
I
criminal
sanctions. :
practitioner or recognized by educj
George
v. Orcu Ltd. 4 Assocs.. 672 P.2d 732,
ational authorities as engineering.
The evidence on the record warrants the inf- 735 (Utah 1983) (quoting Fillmore Prods., Inc.
erence that key held himself out as being able v. Western States Paving. Inc., 561 P . 2 d 6 8 7 ,
to perform certain engineering services, so, 689 (Utah 1977)) (emphasis In original); see
under this provision, he should be construed I also Heber VAlley Truck, Inc. v. Utah Coal A
to have practiced engineering during the rele- Energy. Inc., 611 P .2d 389, 391 (Utah 1980);
Mosley v. Johnson, 2 2 Utah 2d 348, 453 P .2d
vant times.
Utah Code Ann. §38-22-21 (1963) lists 149, 152 (1969); Smith v. American Packing A
the circumstances under which a practitioner Provision Co., 102 Utah 3 5 1 , 130 P . 2 d 9 5 1 .
might be exempted from the licensing requir- 957 (1943). This general rule w a s adopted in
ement. The only arguably applicable exemp- I connection with licensing statutes which did
tion to the licensing requirement is contained not specifically provide, as does section 58-2220, that an unlicensed practitioner cannot
In section 58-22-21(4). which states:
I maintain an action in the state's courts t o
This act shall not be construed to
I enforce the terms o f his contracts. See eg..
prevent or apply to ... The work of
I Loader v. Scott Constr. Corp.. 681 P . 2 d 1227,
an employee or a subordinate of a
1229 (Utah 1984). Because section 58-22-20
person holding a certificate of regI only states explicitly what the general rule has
istration under this act, or an
I been held to be, w e interpret the statute conemployee of a person exempted
sistently with the case law which has developed
from registration by this section;
I under the general rule.
provided such work does not
I T h e general rule is not applied unconditioinclude responsible charge of design
I nally, but only under circumstances in which
or supervision....
The facts dearly establish that lrey was not I the 'party from w h o m the contractor seeks t o
merely an employee or subordinate of ] recover is in the class the legislature intended
Undsey, but that they collaborated on an to protect." Ligneli v. Berg, 593 P 2d 800, 805
equal basis, and that lrey had primary respo- (Utah 1979); see also George, 6 7 2 P 2d at 735;
nsibility for design and manufacturing of the Heber Valley Truck, Inc., 611 P . 2 d at 3 9 1 .
machine. Thus, this section is not applicable, The purpose behind taking this approach is t o
and lrey is not exempt from the licensing I avoid unreasonable penalties and forfeitures
which g o , not to the state, but t o repudiating
requirement.
defendants. Fillmore Prods.. Inc. v. Western
Because lrey practiced engineering as States Paving, Inc., 561 P 2d 6 8 7 , 6 8 9 (Utah
defined by the Act and is not exempted from 1977); see also Loader, 681 P.2d at 1229; Heber
its provisions, he comes under it* provisions, Valley Truck, Inc., 611 P.2d at 391; LigneU. 593
including section 58-22-20 which states, in P . 2 d at 8 0 5 . t a w s i n t e n d e d f o r
relevant part, that:
I protecting the public are not intended to
(n)o person shall bring or maintain
become "an unwarranted shield for the avoiany action in the courts of this state
I dance of a just obligation/ Fillmore Prods..
for enforcement of any contract or
561 P 2d at 690 (quoting Matchett v. Gould,
the recovery of any sums due In
131 Cal. App. 2d 821, 281 P.2d 524 (1955))
connection with the practice of
I and should not alio* a "defendant to take the
engineering or land surveying in this
I benefit of an unlicensed plaintiff's labor and
state as defined herein, without
I refuse to pay for it." Heber Valley Truck,
alleging and proving that he was
Inc. 6 U P 2 d a t 3 9 1 .
duly authorized to practice under
I "A litigant is not a member of [the class the
the provisions of this act....»
I legislature intended to protect) if the required
There is no Utah case law specifically inte- I protection ... U in fact afforded by another
rpreting this provision or other, similar prov- J means," Ligneli. 593 P.2d at 805, such as the
isions. However, the Utah Supreme Court has I litigant bang licensed in the same trade or
stated, regarding the status of unlicensed I profession as the unlicensed practitioner. See
practitioners, that:
e.g.. Heber Valley Truck, Inc.. 611 P 2d at
391-92; UgncU, 592 P 2d at 805; Fillmore
(i]f the purpose of licensing is to
Prods.,
561 P 2d at 689. In Fillmore Products.
protect the public, then the general
I a licensed contractor w h o contracted for seri n M l ADVANCE REPORTS
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vices with an unlicensed contractor was not the machine worked according to the required
1
allowed t o invoke the general rule prohibiting specifications as revised by Chromalox. likthe unlicensed contractor from initiating an ewise, although lrey was not in compliance
action for payment because the unlicensed with the licensing statute, the record contains
contractor's work h a d met all the requirem- evidence from which the jury could conclude
ents and specifications o f the general contract that lrey was engaged in A good faith effort to
and the entire project w a s under the supervi- comply with the statute. See footnote 2.
sion o f a licensed project engineer. Fillmore - We conclude that Chromalox Is not si
Prods.. 561 P.2d at 689; see also Heber Valley member of the legislatively protected dass and
Truck. Inc.. 611 P . 2 d at 391-92. In Loader I that, under these facts, preventing lrey from
v. Scott Construction Corp., the Utah I bringing his action against Chromalox would
Supreme Court found that the defendant from I result in an unreasonable forfeiture. We, thew h o m the unlicensed contractor demanded I refore, find that" I.E.M. may recover for
payment was a licensed contractor, s o did n o t I breach of contraa under the provisions of
belong t o the class o f persons the general rule I section 58-22-20, and affirm the trial
was Intended t o protect, the lay public, 1 court's judgment.
because he was presumed t o possess expertise I
O. Jury Instructions
in the contracting business which would enable I
him t o protect himself. Loader, 681 P . 2 d at I Chromalox demands reversal of the jury
verdict,
alleging
that the trial court committed
1229. Significantly, t h e defendant did n o t I
complain at trial that the unlicensed contra- I prejudicial error by excluding its requested
• »-* . •
ctor's work was unsatisfactory, s o the court I breach of warranty instruction.
assumed that the contractor's performance I Chromalox's attorney submitted the follomet the defendant's expectations. Id Ultim- I wing jury instruction, which the trial court
ately, the court found in favor o f the unlice- I declined to give:
nsed contractor because (1) the defendant was I
Under the written agreement
not a member o f the class the statute was I
entered into on November 2, 1982,
intended to protect, (2) the unlicensed contr- I
the defendant specifically agreed to
actor fully performed the contract and the I
produce a machine for $69,896.00
defendant would be unfairly benefitted by I
plus sales tax, which would produce
avoiding payment, and (3) the unlicensed I
400 accepted bolt to coil terminals
contractor's unlicensed status was the result o f I
of diameter .06 to .115", coil length
a good faith mistake. Id. at 1230.
I
of 2" to 48," |sic] from wire gauges
from 20 to 32, continuous service,
This court will reverse a judgment based ]
convenient servicing and adjustment
upon a jury verdict only if, "viewing the cvi- I
and/or replacing of components.
dence in the light most favorable t o t h e I
This agreement warrants and binds
verdict, there u n o substantial evidence t o I
the defendant to make a machine
support it." Canyon Country Store v. Bracey. I
which would accomplish these spe781 P 2d 414, 417 (Utah 1989) (quoting In re
cific functions.
Estate ofKesler. 702 P 2d 86, 88 (Utah 1985)).
In the event the defendant failed
Where there is conflicting evidence, "we I
to produce a machine which would
assume that the jury believed those facts that I
specifically meet each of the functsupport its verdict ..., and we view the facts I
ions successfully, he would be in
and the reasonable inferences that arise from I
breach of his promise or warranty
those facts in a light most supportive o f the 1
and the plaintiff would be entitled
jury's verdict." Canyon Country Store, 781 I
to its damages.
P.2d at 417 (quoting Bennion v. LeGrand I
Johnson Constr. Co, 701 P.2d 1078, 1082 Instead, the trial court gave the following
(Utah 1985)).
instruction, in relevant part:
In the present case, the Chromalox emplo- I
The plaintiff alleges defendant
yees involved with the project were either lie- I
made them a written offer to build
ensed engineers o r working under the direction I
the plaintiff a machine that would
o f licensed engineers. N e d Blackett w a s a lie- I
do specific things in a set time
ensed engineer, as w a s Charles Ashburn, a I
frame. The plaintiff further alleges
manufacturing engineer w h o assisted lrey with I
that the plaintiff accepted the
design. Mark C o y , the primary Chromalox 1
written offer in writing and has. In
engineer o n the project, was an engineering I
fact, paid in full for the machine.
student working under Blackett's direction. I
The plaintiff alleges that defendant
Under Loader. Chromalox is, thus, presumed I
has had more time than a reason'
to possess expertise in engineering so "is not in I
able time to perform, and that the
need o f the protection the licensing statute was I
plaintiffs now have the machine and
intended to provide t o the lay public." Loader, I
it is not as ordered and is in fact
681 P 2d at 122SM Although substantially
worthless. Plaintiffs therefore claim
controverted, the record further contains cvt- I
that they are entitled to have their
dence from which the jury could conclude that
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

monies returned plus damages they
have suffered because of the breach
of contract. The plaintiff further
alleges that even if the jury were to
find it to be a fact (which plaintiff
denies) that plaintiff; (sic) damaged
the machine, requested additional
features be placed on the machine,
or requested a machine that would
handle previously unanticipated
imperfections in the coils and
washers, that the defendant has still
had adequate time in which to
perform; and that they are therefore
entitled to most of their money
back, as well as damages for breach
of contract.
The remainder of this instruction set forth
I.E.M.'s theory of the case and submitted the
allegations of fact to the jury for its determination. Subsequent to the trial court's charge
to the jury, Chromalox's counsel objected to
the trial court's failure to give its requested
instruction, stating:
One of our causes of action is for
breach of warranty. There's no
instruction in here concerning
breach of warranty for the jury to
rule on. So we except to it, the
lacking of this instruction. We
submitted one to the court on
breach of warranty
The court allowed Chromalox's exception,
but stated that it would go with the instructions as outlined because it believed that
"comment on some specific items wouldthat are requested would actually constitute a
comment on the evidence. The court believes
these matters are open to argument."
It is the trial court's duty to cover both
parties' theories and points of law in giving
jury instructions, provided that there is competent evidence to support them. Power v.
Gene's Bldg. Materials, inc., 567 P.2d 174,
176 (Utah 1977); Black v. McXnighl, 562 P 2d
621, 622 (Utah 1977); Newsom v. Gold Cross
Serv., Inc., 779 P.2d 692. 694 (Utah Ct. App.
1989). However, the trial court may properly
refuse to give instructions if they do not accurately reflect the law governing the factual
situation of the case. Black, 562 P.2d at 622,
or if they tend to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or erroneously
advise on the law. Sec Mikkelson v. Haslam,
764 P.2d 1384.1387 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Upon review of the record and Chromalox's
requested instruction, we agree with the trial I
court. The requested instruction set forth as I
fact two controverted issues: that defendants I
had actually and specifically agreed to the I
terms set forth in the instruction, which corr- I
esponded with the original purchase order I
rather than the alleged changes which evolved I
over the course of production of the machine; I
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and that defendants had not successfully
produced the machine. Because the instruction
implied that these issues had already been
decided, we find that the court appropriately
exercised its discretion because the instruction
could have misled the jury to respondents'
prejudice. We, therefore, find Chromalox's
argument to be without merit.
The judgment is affirmed.
Regnal W. Chuff, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench. Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. Under the new version of the comparable statute,
*(a) person who is not licensed under the provisions
of this chapter may not bring or maintain any
action in the courts of this state for enforcement of
any contract or the recovery of any sums due in
connection with the practice of engineering ... in
this state." This statute was enacted by ch. 24,1986
Utah Laws, effective. April 28. 1986, which repealed
the former sections 58-22-1 to-22 as enacted by
ch. 118. 1955 Utah Laws. Because the events leading
to this appeal occurred from 1982 to 1985. prior to
the effective date of the new statute, the old version
applies.
2. Although the focus under Loader is solely on
whether the parry refusing payment has the very
expertise which the licensing statute is designed to
insure, we note that the possibility of any actual
harm in this case was also greatly mi«t«*i™t by the
availability of engineering expertise to Irey. In
addition to Chromalox's in-house expertise,
several registered engineers worked on, approved,
and certified the project design for I.E.M. Joseph
W. Lindsey, a licensed engineer, regularly consulted
with l.EM. on various projects, including Chromalox's machine, prior to and during the manufacturing stages. He routinely reviewed Irey's designs
and suggested whatever modifications he fdt were
required to make better use of the materials or to
strengthen the machine. Although Lindsey was not
an officer or employee of I E M . he was a stockholder, and was involved with the Chromalox project
at virtually every step, spending about 140 hours on
it. He worked on the preliminary design, the design
of the frame, and the running of tests and analyses
on the machine to assure that it was sound. He
certified the machine design and contracted to have
the machine built in his machine shop. Irey also
employed Robert M. Oriffln. a registered professional engineer, to perform computations and stress
analyses on the rnachuu. Oriffln testified that Irey's
design was more than adequate and was capable of
operating safely and reliably from a mechanical
standpoint. Irey additionally engaged Robert Kirk,
also a registered engineer, to design the computer
and software packages.
3. We note here that
(tlhe question on appeal from a judgment based on a jury verdict is not
whether mere Is substantial evidence
which would have supported a contrary
verdict, or even whether tab Court, had
it been trier of fact, would have reached
the same verdict as that reached by the
jury Rather, the issue is whether the
jury's findings are supported by subst-
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prerogative of the legislature to create the law.
antial competent evidence.
Canyon Country Store, 7g| P.2d at 418 (quoting la Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah
1981). Thus, we afford the legislature's enaft Estate ofKeskr, 702 F 2d 86,95 (Utah 1985)).
ctments a presumption of validity. Id.;
Greaves v. State. 528 P.2d 805, 806-07 (Utah
1974); Pride Club. Inc. v. State, 25 Utah 2d
Qtaas
333. 481 P.2d 669, 670 (Utah 1971). We will
121 Utah Adv. Rep. 15
not strike down a statute unless it appears to
be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
' IN THE
doubt. Greaves, 528 P.2d at 807; Pride Oub,
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
481 P.2d at 670. Nor will we declare a statute
unconstitutional if we can find any reasonable
STATE of Utah,
basis to bring it within a constitutional framPlaintiff and Respondeat,
ework. Greaves, 528 P.2d at 807; State v.
v.
Packard. 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561. 563
David DAVIS,
(Utah 1952).
Defeadaat aad Appellant.
I. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION
No. 890009-CA
Defendant contends the Utah Drug Stamp
PILED: February 12, 1990
Tax Act requires him to incriminate himself in'
violation of the fifth amendment of the United
Weber County, Second District
States Constitution.* He asserts that proof he
Honorable Ronald O. Hyde
purchased and posted the stamps could be
ATTORNEYS:
used to provide a link in the chain of evidence
Stephen R. McCaughey and Patricia Oeary,
in a subsequent drug prosecution against him.
' Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Defendant claims that the mere purchase of
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra Sjogren, Salt
the stamps is an admission of criminal behavior because the law only applies to individLake City, for Respondent
uals unlawfully in possession of controlled
Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Orme.
substances.'
The state argues, on the other hand, that
OPINION
the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act does not
require
stamp purchasers to identify themseBILLINGS, Judge:
lves or even to appear in person to pay the tax
Defendant David Davis was charged with and obtain the stamps.4 Thus, the state claims
possession of a controlled substance without the tax commission, under the Utah statutory
the required tax stamps affixed, a third degree scheme, receives no incriminating information
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §59- to disclose to prosecutors.
19-105 (1988). Defendant filed a motion to
The United States Supreme Court has long
dismiss the charge, claiming that section 59held that the government may tax illegal acti19-105 of the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act" U
vities. See License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 471unconstitutional. The trial court denied his
73, 18 L. Ed. 497, 501 (1867); MarchetU v.
motion and consequently defendant entered a
United States, 390 U.S. 39. 44 (1968).
conditional plea of no contest.
However, the government may not establish a
Defendant argues on appeal that (1) the method of taxation that violates the fifth
Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act violates his privi- amendment. Id. at 44. In order to evaluate
lege against sdf-wcrimination under the fifth defendant's claims, we first review the scope
amendment of the United States Constitution of protection afforded by the fifth amendment
and article I, section 12 of the Utah Constit- and then focus on prior decisions discussing
ution; and (2) the Utah Drug Stamp Tax Act the relationship between taxes levied on illegal
Is void for vagueness under the fourteenth activities and the constitutional privilege
amendment to the United States Constitution against sdf-mcrimination.
and article I, section 7 of the Utah ConstituThe fifth amendment to the United States
tion. We affirm.
Constitution provides: 0 No person shall be ...
A constitutional challenge to a statute pre- compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
sents a question of law, and thus, we review against himself ....* This right arises when the
the trial court's conclusion, that the Utah government requests information that will
Drug Stamp Tax Act is constitutional, for subject a person to criminal liability, Garner
correctness. See Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 v. United States, 424 U.S. 648. 655 (1976),
P.2d 673, 674 (Utah 1989); Provo City Corp. and applies to compelled written as well as
v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989); see oral testimony. Albertson v. Subversive Actialso Scharf v. BMO Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, vities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 78 (1965);
1070 (Utah 1985). •
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